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SUMMARY
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, the United States recognized the inde-
pendence of all the former Central Asian
republics and established diplomatic relations
with each by mid-March 1992.  The United
States also supported their admission to the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and other Western organiza-
tions, and elicited Turkish support in counter-
ing Iranian influence in the region.  Congress
was at the forefront in urging the formation of
coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and
other Eurasian states of the former Soviet
Union, and approved the Freedom Support
Act and other legislation for this purpose.
Soon after the terrorist attacks on Amer-
ica on September 11, 2001, all the Central
Asian states offered overflight and other
support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in
Afghanistan.  Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and
provided access to airbases.  After 9/11, the
United States  boosted its security assistance
throughout the region for anti-terrorism,
counter-narcotics, non-proliferation, border
and customs, and defense cooperation pro-
grams, while also increasing aid for democra-
tization and free market reforms.  
U.S. policy goals in Central Asia include
fostering stability, democratization, free mar-
ket economies, free trade and transport
throughout the Eurasian corridor, de-
nuclearization in the non-Russian states, and
adherence to international human rights stan-
dards.  An over-arching U.S. priority is to dis-
courage attempts by extremist regimes and
groups to block or subvert progress toward
these goals.  Administration policy also aims
to integrate these states into the international
community so that they follow responsible
security and other policies, and to discourage
xenophobic and anti-Western orientations that
threaten peace and stability. The Administra-
tion is concerned about human rights and civil
liberties problems in all the states.  The Admin-
istration’s policy goals in Central Asia reflect
the differing characteristics of these states.
U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include the secu-
rity and elimination of Soviet-era nuclear and
biological weapons materials and facilities.  In
Tajikistan, U.S. aid increasingly focuses on
economic reconstruction.  U.S. energy firms
have invested in oil and natural gas develop-
ment in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan.  
Some observers call for different empha-
ses or levels of U.S. involvement in Central
Asia.  Some have called for strengthening
conditions linking aid to progress in improv-
ing human rights or in making adequate prog-
ress in democratization and the creation of
free markets.  Some have disputed the impor-
tance of energy resources to U.S. national
security.  Others point to civil and ethnic
tensions in the region as possibly endangering
U.S. lives and investments. Heightened con-
gressional interest in Central Asia was re-
flected in passage of “Silk Road” language in
late 1999 (P.L.106-113) authorizing  enhanced
U.S. policy attention and aid to support con-
flict amelioration, humanitarian needs, eco-
nomic development, transport (including
energy pipelines) and communications, border
controls, democracy, and the creation of civil




Central Asia: Basic Facts
Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kaz-
akhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq.
mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan:
190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
Population: 57.1 million (2002 est., Economist
Intelligence Unit), somewhat less than France;
Kazakhstan: 14.8 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 4.9 m.; Taj-
ikistan: 6.4 m.; Turkmenistan: 5.4 m.; Uzbeki-
stan: 25.6 m.
Gross Domestic Product: $47.7 billion in 2001;
per capita GDP is about $948; poverty is ram-
pant.  Kazakhstan: $24.8b.; Kyrgyzstan: $1.6b.;
Tajikistan: $1.1b.; Turkmenistan: $12.3b.; Uz-
bekistan: $7.9 b. (EIU, current prices)
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Hailing U.S.-led coalition victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, Uzbekistan’s President
Islam Karimov stated on May 4, 2003, that “the balance of power on the economic and
political map of the world has changed.”  On May 8, his National Security Council endorsed
sending medical and other humanitarian and rebuilding aid to Iraq.  Uzbekistan was heavily
criticized for alleged fiscal and monetary mismanagement and human rights abuses during
the annual meeting of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), held
in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on May 4-5, 2003.  EBRD President Jean Lemierre stressed that the
bank’s future cooperation with Uzbekistan would depend on Tashkent's fulfilment of civil
society and economic reforms.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of the former
Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,
and borders Russia, China, the Middle East,
and South Asia.  The major peoples of all
but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the
Tajiks speak an Iranian language), and most
are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia
Muslims).  Most are closely related histori-
cally and culturally. By the late 19th
century, Russian tsars had conquered the
last independent khanates and nomadic
lands of Central Asia.  After the breakup of
the tsarist empire, Central Asia was at first
included within Soviet Russia, but by 1936
five “union republics” had been created.
Soviet communist rule resulted in massive
loss of life from collectivization and purges, though economic development took place.
Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the five republics gained
worldwide diplomatic recognition.  (For overviews, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan;
CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan; CRS Report 97-1055,
Turkmenistan; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan.)
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States recognized
the independence of all the former Central Asian republics.  Citing the dangers they faced
from Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. diplomatic relations were  established
with all five new states by mid-March 1992.  Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere that
the Administration devise a policy on aiding the new Eurasian states, former President Bush
IB93108 05-09-03
CRS-2
sent the Freedom Support Act to Congress, which was amended and signed into law in
October 1992 (P.L. 102-511).  In 1999, Congressional concerns led to passage of the “Silk
Road Strategy Act” authorizing language (contained in Consolidated Appropriations for
FY2000; P.L. 106-113) calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration,
humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls,
democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.  
Post-9/11.  Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the
Administration has stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia focuses on three inter-related
activities: the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy development.  The 9/11
attacks led the Administration to realize that “it was critical to the national interests of the
United States that we greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries” to
prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony in June 2002.  In a speech on April 10, 2003, Assistant
Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones reiterated that the “United States is wholly committed to
intensive engagement and dialogue” with a “pivotal region of the world,” and committed to
assist the countries to “remain independent, and become democratic, stable, and prosperous
partners of the United States.”
Immediately after 9/11, the Central Asian governments condemned the attacks, but over
the next two weeks, as U.S. attention focused on Afghanistan, none unambiguously offered
to permit overflight rights or U.S. military airbase access.  However, since Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan had long supported the Northern Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, they
were predisposed to welcome U.S.-led backing for the Northern Alliance.  These Central
Asian states, along with Kyrgyzstan, also had suffered from incursions by the IMU and other
terrorists, who were harbored by the Taliban.
On September 24, 2001, Turkmenistan’s President Saparamurad Niyazov gave his
consent for ground transport and overflights to deliver humanitarian aid to support U.S. anti-
terrorism efforts in Afghanistan because “evil must be punished.”  Kazakhstan’s President
Nazarbayev also offered airfields, military bases, and airspace.   That evening, President
Putin stated that Russia would support U.S. efforts by providing intelligence, overflight
rights for humanitarian cargoes, access to Central Asian airbases, and support for the
Northern Alliance.  The next day, Kyrgyz President Akayev indicated that he had received
the backing of the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS’s)
Collective Security Treaty for U.S. use of Kyrgyz airspace for anti-terrorism in Afghanistan.
On September 24, 2001, Uzbek President Karimov permitted U.S. use of Uzbek airspace
against Afghan-based terrorists for “humanitarian and security purposes” if Uzbekistan’s
security was guaranteed.  This condition was met with a U.S.-Uzbek agreement signed on
October 7, a Joint Statement issued on October 12, 2001, and a Declaration on the Strategic
Partnership signed on March 12, 2002 (see below, Security). 
The United States and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of understanding on July 10,
2002, permitting U.S. military aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airport in Almaty for emergency
military landings.  The accord was needed in part because military flights out of Kyrgyzstan’s
Ganci airbase at Manas Airport, 120 miles away, can be disrupted by harsh weather.  A few
days later, the United States and Kazakhstan reached another agreement providing increased
U.S. military training and equipment for the Kazakh armed forces.  The United States is
refurbishing a military base at Atyrau on the Caspian Sea to help Kazakhstan provide land
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and sea security for its energy resources.  The State Department’s Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2002 report, released April 30, 2003, highlighted Kazakhstan’s, Kyrgyzstan’s,
Tajikistan’s, and Uzbekistan’s continuing “strong” and “unprecedented” support for U.S. and
international anti-terrorism efforts, including Kazakhstan’s approval of more than 800 U.S.
overflights in support of coalition actions in Afghanistan since December 2001.(see also
below, Security).
Support for Iraqi Freedom.  Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state that joined
the coalition of the willing that endorsed military operations in Iraq.  Uzbek President Islam
Karimov on March 6 stated that the Iraq operation was a continuation of “efforts to break the
back of terrorism,” and the government said it would provide post-war medical and
construction aid to Iraq.  Among other Central Asian states, Kazakh Foreign Minister
Kasymzhomart Tokayev on March 28 voiced general support for disarming Iraq.  Tajik
President Emomaliy Rakhmanov reportedly on March 13 refused Russia’s request to
denounce coalition actions in Iraq.  However, Sayed Abdullo Nuri, head of Tajikistan’s
Islamic Renaissance Party, on March 26 termed the Iraq conflict a “disgraceful”
humanitarian disaster, but rejected talk of an anti-coalition jihad.  Kyrgyzstan’s Legislative
Assembly (lower chamber) issued a statement on March 24 calling for the United States to
cease “gross violations” of international law by undertaking military action in Iraq.
There are various views among U.S. policymakers and others on the types and levels
of U.S. involvement in the region, although there is basic support for advocating democratic
and economic reforms and stability in the region.  Many of those who endorse continued or
enhanced U.S. support for Central Asia argue that political instability and the growth of
terrorist groups in Central Asia can produce spillover effects both in important nearby states,
including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey, and worldwide.  They also argue that the
United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly
acquiring nuclear weapons-related technology in the region.  They maintain that U.S.
interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other
actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as
the superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights.  They stress that
U.S. leadership in world aid efforts to foster reform will help alleviate the social distress
exploited by anti-Western Islamic extremist groups to gain new members.  Although many
U.S. policymakers acknowledge a role for a democratizing Russia in the region, they stress
that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthen the independence of the states and
forestall Russian attempts to re-subjugate the region.
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward
U.S. policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after 9/11, but aspects of these views
could gain more credence once Afghanistan appears less unstable.  These observers argued
that the United States historically had few interests in this region and that developments there
were largely marginal to U.S. interests.  They advocated limited U.S. contacts undertaken
with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. interests.  They discounted fears that
anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes
or otherwise harm U.S. interests.  They were dubious of claims of sizeable oil and gas
resources in these new states and argued that, in any event, such resources could not be
economically developed and delivered to Western markets.  Other still topical arguments
include whether the United States should continue to try to foster democratization among
cultures some view as historically attuned to authoritarianism.  Some observers urge reducing
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or cutting off most aid to repressive governments that widely violate human rights, arguing
that such aid provides tacit support for these regimes, and might even unwittingly be fueling
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent.  These observers
reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, regional cooperation,
trade, and investment outweigh concerns over democratization and human rights.  They warn
that the populations of these states may come to view U.S. engagement as propping up
authoritarian leaders.  Some observers point to civil problems in the region as another reason
for the United States to eschew major involvement such as military access that might place
more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible
members of the international community, and supported their admission to the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other Western
organizations.  The United States has supported these integrative goals through bilateral aid
and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey.
These and other means are used to discourage radical regimes, groups, and Islamic
fundamentalists — who use repression or violence to oppose democratization — from
attempts to gain influence.  All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam, but display
hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism.  At the same time,  they have established some
trade and aid ties with Iran.  While they have had greater success in attracting development
aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the long run, their
foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may more closely reflect the concerns
of other Islamic states.  (See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security.)
Russia’s Role.  The events of 9/11 may weaken Russia’s influence over  the Central
Asian states, though long-term impacts depend on the duration and scope of U.S. and
coalition presence in the region, Russia’s countervailing polices, and the fate of Afghanistan.
Prior to 9/11, the Putin Administration had tried to strengthen Russia’s interests in the region
while opposing the growth of U.S. and other influence.  On the other hand, while calling
Central Asia an important or even “vital” interest of the United States, U.S. Administrations
had generally deferred to Russia on regional security issues and had refused major U.S.
military assistance to the states to combat terrorism.  Russia’s other reasons for permitting
the increased U.S. and coalition presence after 9/11 included its interests in boosting some
economic and other ties to the West and its hope of regaining influence in a post-Taliban
Afghanistan.  Russia cooperated with Central Asia in supporting U.S. and coalition efforts,
including by quickly sending military equipment and advisors to assist the Northern Alliance
in attacks on the Taliban.  On September 19, 2001, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
indicated that the nature of support given by the Central Asian states to the U.S.-led coalition
was up to each state, and President Putin reiterated this point on September 24, 2001, giving
Russia’s accedence to cooperation between these states and the United States. 
In accord with long-standing U.S. policy, the Bush Administration generally views a
democratizing Russia as able to play a traditional stabilizing role in Central Asia, though
emphasizes that Russia should not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and other
involvement.  Assistant Secretary of State Jones reiterated this policy on February 11, 2002,
stating that  “our goal with the Russians is to make sure they understand that ... we’re not
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trying to take over Central Asia from them, but we have ... international common interests
that we will be transparent about.”  While some observers continue to warn that Russia seeks
to reabsorb Central Asia into a new empire, most discount Russia’s capabilities, if not
intentions, because of what they view as Russia’s deep economic, ethnic, and military
problems.  Virtually all U.S. analysts  agree, however, that Russia’s actions should be
monitored to ensure that they do not infringe on the independence of the Central Asian states.
Russian officials have variously emphasized interests in strategic security and economic
ties with Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians.  Strategic
concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region’s role  as a
buffer to Islamic extremism.  By the late 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by
Central Asia caused it to reduce its security presence, a trend that President Putin may be
seeking to reverse.  About 12,000 Russian Border Troops (mostly ethnic Tajiks under
Russian command) still defend “CIS borders” in Tajikistan, but were largely phased out in
Kyrgyzstan in 1999.  Russia justified a 1999 military basing accord with Tajikistan for its
estimated 7,800 Russian troops of the 201st motorized rifle division stationed there by citing
the Islamic extremist threat to the CIS.  In late 1999, the last Russian military advisors left
Turkmenistan.  In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty, citing its
ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness. 
In an apparent shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January
2000, then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept” that termed foreign
efforts to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia a security threat.  In April 2000,
Russia called for the members of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) to approve the
creation of rapid reaction forces, including in Central Asia, to combat terrorism emanating
from Afghanistan, and hinted that such a force might launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan
terrorist bases.  These hints elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint and consult the
UN, and elicited Taliban warnings of reprisals against Central Asian states if they permitted
Russia to use their bases for strikes.  Marking mutual concern, Presidents Clinton and Putin
agreed at their June 2000 summit to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related
terrorism, and the group held two meetings prior to 9/11.  A May 2001 CST summit
approved the creation of a Central Asian force composed of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik
country-based battalions and a headquarters in Bishkek.  This initiative seemed in part aimed
to protect Russian regional influence in the face of nascent U.S. and NATO anti-terrorism
moves in the region against Afghanistan.  CIS members in 2001 also approved the creation
of a regional Anti-Terrorist Center (composed of intelligence agencies) in Kyrgyzstan.  These
events prior to 9/11 helped to ease the way for Russian and Central Asian assistance to the
U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.
Soon after 9/11, Russia demonstrably reversed its policy of drawing down its military
presence in Central Asia by increasing its troop presence in Tajikistan.  In mid-June 2002,
Russia also signed military accords with Kyrgyzstan extending leases on military facilities
to fifteen years, opening shuttered Kyrgyz defense industries, and  training Kyrgyz troops.
Most significantly, Kyrgyzstan also agreed that its Kant airfield outside its capital of Bishkek
could be used as a base for the Central Asian rapid reaction force. In signing the accords,
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov declared that they marked Russia’s help – along
with the U.S.-led coalition and China – in combating terrorism, were necessary for Russia
to monitor the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and marked Russia’s intention
to maintain a military presence in the region.
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Economically, Russia seeks to counter Western business interests and gain substantial
influence over oil and gas resources in the region through participation in joint ventures and
by insisting that pipeline routes transit Russian territory.  At the same time, Russia has
avoided large economic subsidies to the region.  Russia’s views regarding a Western role in
energy development in the Caspian remain complex.  Particularly after the signing of the
Statement on Energy Cooperation at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia summit, it appeared that
Russia would support or accept a Western role in the Caspian region, including construction
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.  In April 2003, Leonard Coburn of the U.S.
Energy Department testified to Congress that “the Russians have basically said as long as the
economics are there, they have no objection to [the BTC pipeline].”  However, Russian
energy firms (including Lukoil and the state-owned Transneft) have failed to participate in
building or to commit to supplying the BTC pipeline, and some Russian officials have
continued to argue that the pipeline is un-necessary and un-economical, and that a proposed
undersea link to Kazakhstan is environmentally hazardous. 
 The safety of Russians in Central Asia is a populist concern in Russia, but has in
practice mainly served as a political stalking horse for those in Russia advocating the
“reintegration” of former “Russian lands.”  Ethnic Russians residing in Central Asia have
had rising concerns about employment, language, and other policies or practices they deem
discriminatory and many have emigrated, contributing to their decline from 20 million in
1989 to 6.6 million in 2001.  They now constitute 12% of the population of Central Asia,
according to the CIS Statistics Agency.  Remaining Russians tend to be elderly or
low-skilled.  In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again become the majority.
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
The presidents of four out of five of the Central Asian states have been in power since
independence, and were previous communist party heads or officials during the Soviet
period.   They have remained in place by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by
limiting political freedoms.  U.S. policymakers have warned, however, that political
repression ultimately harms stability.  The lack of obvious successors to the present leaders
raises concern among many observers.  Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Court in 1999 ruled that
President Askar Akayev could run for a third term as president, although the constitution set
a two-term limit, and Niyazov orchestrated a constitutional change in late 1999 naming him
president for life.  Nazarbayev too in 2000 gained some official powers for life.  A
referendum in early 2002 extended Karimov’s term to 2007.  Rakhmanov will benefit from
proposed constitutional changes that will permit him to run for another 7-year term.  Belying
the appearance of stability, Uzbekistan’s capital of Tashkent was shaken in February 1999
by explosions that Karimov denounced as a coup attempt (see below, Bombings), an
attempted coup was launched against Niyazov in November 2002, and Karimov’s,
Niyazov’s, and Akayev’s regimes face rising popular protest (see below, Democratization).
Regional Tensions and Conflicts.  The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups,
convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose serious problems to stability in all the
Central Asian states.  With the Soviet collapse, most in Central Asia support national
identities, but also are emphasizing identifications with clan, family, region, and Islam.
Some in the four Turkic-language states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan) promote a pan-Turkic identity.  Most analysts conclude that in the foreseeable
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future, the term Central Asia will denote a geographic area more than a region of shared
identities and aspirations, although it can be argued that the land-locked, poverty-stricken,
and non-populous region will need to embrace economic integration in order to develop.
Central Asia’s borders, described as among the world’s most convoluted, fail to
accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to potential
instability.  Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries
and Afghanistan.  In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population.  More
ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in
Turkmenistan.  Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven million
in Afghanistan.  Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province.  The fertile
Ferghana Valley was divided by Stalin among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan,
leaving large numbers of people outside their “national” borders.  Criss-crossing mountains
thwart Tajikistan’s integrity.
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai treaty”
with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in
1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese
border.  China has used the treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic
Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them
to extradite Uighurs fleeing China (for details, see CRS Report RL31213, China’s Relations
with Central Asian States).  In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO).   The SCO played no real role in U.S.-led coalition actions
in Afghanistan.  China and Russia have appeared to move slowly in bolstering the SCO,
since some of the reasons for forming it – to counter terrorism and limit U.S. presence –
appear less salient since the United States moved militarily into the region after 9/11.  Some
Chinese officials have acknowledged that U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in the region have
increased stability along China’s borders.  Nonetheless, Russia and China retain long term
interests in limiting the U.S. presence and in gaining influence in the region.
The Bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.  After the February 16, 1999, explosions, which
by various reports killed 16-28 and wounded 100-351, Uzbek officials detained dozens of
suspects, including political dissidents.  Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh
(former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding
the plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (former leader of the banned Uzbek Adolat social
movement) and the Taliban.  The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 resulted in six
receiving the death sentence.  The suspects were described in court proceedings as Islamic
terrorists who received training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban), Tajikistan, Pakistan, and
Russia (by the terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev, and militia
head Jama Namanganiy.  Testimony alleged that Solikh had joined the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU), led by Yuldashev and Namanganiy, in mid-1997, and that Solikh,
Yuldashev, Namanganiy, and others had agreed that Solikh would be president and
Yuldashev defense minister after Karimov was overthrown and a caliphate established.  In
November 2000, the Uzbek Supreme Court convicted twelve persons of terrorism, nine of
whom were tried in absentia.  The absent Yuldashev and Namanganiy were given death
sentences and the absent Solikh, 15.5 years in prison.  U.S. officials criticized the apparent
lack of due process during the trial.  Solikh has rejected accusations of involvement in the
bombings or membership in the IMU.  Yuldashev too has eschewed responsibility for the
bombings but warned that more might occur if Karimov does not step down.
IB93108 05-09-03
CRS-8
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and
attacks American citizens.  The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government
in Uzbekistan,” it warned, linking the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-
2000.  The IMU is being aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden, according
to the State Department, and it stressed that the “United States supports the right of
Uzbekistan to defend its sovereignty and  territorial integrity from the violent actions of the
IMU,” in ways that respect basic human rights.  According to Patterns of Global Terrorism
2002, IMU forces assisting the Taliban against coalition actions in Afghanistan suffered
major losses, and Namanganiy was probably killed, but the IMU remains a regional threat.
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan.  Several hundred Islamic extremists and others  first
invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999.  Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group.
They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in
south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan.  With Uzbek and Kazakh air
and other support, Kyrgyz forces finally forced the guerrillas out in October 1999.
According to some observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorism in
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia (Chechnya), and elsewhere and the weakness of
Kyrgyzstan’s security forces.  Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan in August 2000.  Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz
forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000, reporting
the loss of 30 Kyrgyz troops.  According to the State Department, the IMU did not invade
the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because bin Laden had secured
its aid for the Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance.
Civil War in Tajikistan.  State Department officials served as observers at the
U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks and pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild after a peace
settlement, indications of the Administration’s efforts to ease ethnic and civil tensions in the
Eurasian states.  The United States has been the major humanitarian donor to alleviate the
effects of the Tajik civil war.  The United States supported the presence of  U.N. observers
in Tajikistan, and urged Russian-CIS “peacekeeping” forces to cooperate fully with them and
to abide by international law.  U.S. programs in Tajikistan have been complicated by the U.S.
closure of its embassy in Dushanbe in 1998, and relocation of personnel to Kazakhstan,
because of inadequate security.  Beginning in 2000, some diplomatic personnel have traveled
back and forth to Dushanbe.  A site has been leased where a secure chancery will be built.
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up.  In September 1992,  a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups –  largely consisting of members of
Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power –  tried
to take over.  Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia,
launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000
casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to
Afghanistan.  These United Tajik Opposition (UTO) rebels variously received help from Iran
and the IMU.  In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan, consisting of
Russian and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops.  After the two sides agreed to a
cease-fire, the U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in
Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994.  In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali
Rakhmanov and UTO leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement,
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under which Rakhmanov remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allotted to
the opposition.  Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, and the NRC disbanded
in March 2000.  UNMOT pulled out in May 2000, and a small U.N. Tajikistan Office of
Peace-Building (UNTOP) was set up to facilitate aid.  The CIS declared its peacekeeping
mandate fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing agreement.
Tajikistan’s future remains clouded by regional, ethnic, and religious tensions and poverty.
It is among the world’s poorest countries.
Democratization and Human Rights
A major concern of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term
development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights.  U.S.
democratization support has been provided for political parties, voter education and electoral
laws, legal and constitutional reform, media, structuring the division and balance of
governmental powers, and parliamentary and educational exchanges.  At the same time, the
United States has worked with the ex-Communist Party officials who have led in the five
states (even in Tajikistan, the current president was once a low-level party official) since
before independence, recognizing that they may continue to hold power for some time. 
Scenarios of political development in Central Asia include continued rule in most of the
states by former Soviet elites, gradual transitions to more nationalistic elites who are at least
somewhat democratic and Western-oriented, or large-scale and perhaps violent transitions
to Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule.  All the Central Asian leaders have given
assurances to the United States that they support democratization, but all have continued to
rule largely as they did during the communist period, with minimal adaptations.  During
Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic
Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human
rights, and economic reform.  During his December 2001 visit, Nazarbayev repeated these
pledges in a joint statement with President Bush.  In March 2002, Uzbek Foreign Minister
Abdulaziz Komilov and Secretary Powell signed a Strategic Partnership Declaration pledging
Uzbekistan to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press.
During previous visits in 1997 and 1999 to Washington, D.C., Tajikistan’s President
Rakhmanov was not received at the presidential level as a protest against failures in
democratization, but during his December 2002 visit he met with President Bush and other
top officials, and the Administration highlighted Tajikistan’s recent “significant progress”
in democratization and its support for U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2002, presidential power in all the Central Asian states overshadows legislative and judicial
power, and all the states have lost ground in democratization.  Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
are generally viewed as the most repressive, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan permit some
limited free expression and other rights.  Tajikistan experienced many conflict-related human
rights abuses in the course of  its 1992-1997 civil war, but during its fragile peace there have
been a few human rights improvements.  In most of the states, religious freedom is
threatened by repression against nonfavored faiths, missionaries, and pious Muslims who
tend to be viewed as extremists. Unfair elections and unseemly extensions of presidential
terms increase political alienation and frustration among the populations and contribute to
the formation of clandestine groups seeking to overthrow the regimes.  In its 2002
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Trafficking in Persons Report, the State Department categorized Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
as having serious problems with human trafficking for labor or prostitution.  If the states do
not make serious efforts to reduce trafficking by the time of issuance of the 2003 report, they
could be subject to aid sanctions (however, there is a presidential waiver provision).  
The U.N. Rapporteur on Torture in March 2003 completed a draft report on his late
2002 visit to Uzbekistan that concluded that police and prison officials systematically
employed torture and other coercive means to obtain confessions and as punishment.  The
Uzbek government denied that human rights problems in the prisons were systematic, while
admitting that some instances of abuse occurred but were being fully addressed.  In a speech
on April 10, 2003, Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones reported that the
Administration’s “persistent and consistent diplomatic engagement” with Uzbekistan had
resulted in recent months in “real achievements” in improving human rights conditions in
Uzbekistan.  The State Department’s 2002 Human Rights Report also commends Uzbekistan
for permitting the Birlik opposition movement to hold meetings.  On May 6, 2003, it held
its first congress since 1992, re-electing exiled Abdurahim Polatov as its head and resolving
to petition the government for legalization.
In Turkmenistan, a late November 2002 failed coup resulted in dozens of arrests and
trials, the first of which resulted in the quick conviction in late December of former Turkmen
foreign minister Boris Shikhmuradov and two other opposition leaders (tried in absentia) for
organizing the coup attempt.  The U.S. State Department strongly protested violations of
legal due process and “credible reports” of forced confessions and other human rights abuses.
Concerns about human rights led OSCE members to call for a fact-finding mission.
Although Niyazov refused to let the mission into the country, it drew up a sharply negative
assessment of Turkmenistan’s recent human rights record.  The United States supported the
passage of a resolution by the U.N. Human Rights Commission on April 16, 2003, that
strongly condemned political repression and other human rights abuses in Turkmenistan.
U.S. citizen Leonid Komarovsky, who was held for alleged involvement in the coup attempt,
was finally permitted to leave Turkmenistan on April 24, 2003 (see also CRS Report
RS21384, Turkmenistan’s Attempted Coup).
Some critics who argue that there have been stepped-up human rights abuses in
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan  – despite U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan that helped
to ease terrorist threats to the regimes – surmise that leaders of these states have viewed post-
9/11 U.S. policy as being less interested in human rights.  Others surmise that regional
populations have pressed democratization demands, emboldened by the U.S. presence.
In Congress, conferees on H.R. 4775 (H.Rept.107-593; an emergency supplemental for
FY2002; P.L. 107-206 ) called for added Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid to
Uzbekistan to be conditioned on a report by the Secretary of State that it is making progress
in meeting its human rights commitments under the “Strategic Partnership” agreement.
Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7; signed into law on February 20, 2003)
goes further, forbidding FREEDOM Support Act assistance to the government of Uzbekistan
unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that Uzbekistan is making substantial
progress in meeting its Strategic Partnership Declaration commitments to democratize and
respect human rights.  P.L. 108-7 also forbids assistance to the government of Kazakhstan
unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that Kazakhstan has significantly
improved its human rights record during the preceding six-month period.  Unlike the case
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with Uzbekistan, the legislation permits the Secretary to waive this requirement on national
security grounds.  These provisions in P.L. 108-7 reflect the similar concerns of S.J.Res. 3,
introduced January 14, 2003, and approved with amendment on May 1, which criticizes
Central Asian governments for human rights abuses, and calls on the President to condition
U.S. political, economic and military relations with the regional governments on their respect
for human rights and democracy.  A similar bill, H.Con.Res. 32, was introduced on February
11, 2003, and referred to the House International Relations Committee.
Security and Arms Control
Since 9/11, U.S. and coalition action in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to halt the
export of terrorism from Afghanistan has greatly increased the security of Central Asia.  The
development of U.S. security ties with Central Asia pre-9/11 facilitated the cooperation of
the states in OEF.  Reportedly, such pre-9/11 ties included Uzbek permission for U.S.
clandestine efforts against al Qaeda in Afghanistan.  According to Assistant Secretary of
Defense Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each [Central
Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September 11th.”  Kyrgyzstan,
he relates, is a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing basing for combat and combat
support units at Manas Airport (at the U.S.-designated Ganci airbase) for U.S., French,
Italian, Norwegian, Canadian, and South Korean forces.  Uzbekistan provides a base for U.S.
operations at Karshi-Khanabad and a base for German units at Termez, and a land corridor
to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at Termez.  Kazakhstan has
provided overflight rights and expedited rail transhipment of supplies.  Turkmenistan has
permitted blanket overflight and refueling privileges for humanitarian flights.  Tajikistan has
permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for U.S., British, and French refueling
and basing.  While the Administration has rejected the idea of permanent military bases in
these states, Crouch stated in June 2002 that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and
security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat
terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control. (See also CRS
Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security.)
Among the accords, on March 12, 2002, a U.S.-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic
Partnership was signed that includes a nonspecific security guarantee.  The United States
affirms that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security
and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response.  The two
states pledge to intensify military cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed Forces”
of Uzbekistan.  Similarly, visiting Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and President Bush issued
a joint statement on  September 23, 2002, pledging to deepen the strategic partnership,
including cooperation in counter-terrorism. 
A small but increasing amount of U.S. security assistance was provided to the region
pre-9/11, and much more after 9/11.  All the states receive FMF and International Military
Education and Training (IMET) assistance, and are eligible to receive Excess Defense
Articles (EDA) on a grant basis.  Increasing support is also provided to enhance border
security to combat trafficking in drugs, humans, and weapons of mass destruction.  In 2003,
the Drug Enforcement Administration will set up its first counter-narcotics unit in the region
in Uzbekistan. U.S. Central Command in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military
engagement activities, planning, and operations in Central Asia.  It states that its peacetime
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strategy aims to foster “apolitical, professional militaries capable of responding to regional
peacekeeping and humanitarian needs” in the region.  USCENTCOM Commanders visited
the region regularly, setting the stage for more extensive military ties post-9/11.  Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited the region in December 2001 and April-May 2002.  
Efforts to foster military cooperation were furthered when all the Central Asian states
except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994.  Tajikistan decided to join PFP before
9/11, and signed accords on admission in February 2002.  Central Asian officers and troops
have participated in PFP exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops
participated in exercises in Central Asia in 1997, 1998, and 2000.  Many in Central Asia
viewed these exercises as “sending a message” to Islamic extremists and others in
Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere against fostering regional instability.  Central Asian PFP
command exercises termed “Regional Cooperation” were held in Germany in mid-2001.  On
April 28-30, 2003, participants and observers from over nineteen NATO and PFP countries
(including all the Central Asian states but Turkmenistan) took part in “Ferghana 2003"
emergency rescue exercises in Uzbekistan.
Weapons of Mass Destruction.  Major U.S. security interests have included
elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet
Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia.  The United States
has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear
technology and materials, including because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries.
In December 2002, Harlan Strauss, the head of Counterproliferation Programs at the U.S.
Defense Department, reported that U.S. aid had assisted Central Asian states during 2002 in
halting the smuggling of radioactive materials out of the region that could have been used
in so-called “dirty bombs” (radioactive materials mixed with conventional explosives).
   
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in
reality Russia controlled these weapons).  Though some in Kazakhstan urged “retaining” the
weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state.  All bombers and their
air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994.  On April 21, 1995, the
last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and
transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free.  The
SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994 and most silos were blown up in 1995-1996.  In
December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a  CTR umbrella agreement for
the “safe and secure” dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related
purposes.  In June 2002, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an extension accord to
destroy six remaining silos at the Leninsk testing ground in the Kyzyl-Orda region.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines,
and milling facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that pose proliferation
concerns.  Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium.
Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world’s only nuclear desalinization
facility.  Shut down in April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and
plutonium spent fuel in storage pools.  Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan report that their mining
and milling activities have resulted in massive and hazardous waste dumps.  In 1997 and
1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on safeguarding and mothballing the Aktau reactor
and eventually removing its weapons-grade plutonium.
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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
facilities during the Soviet era.  CTR and Energy Department funds are being used to
eliminate infrastructure at a former biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan, and for retraining scientists.  At the U.S.-Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in
May 1999, the two sides signed a CTR agreement on securing, dismantling, and
decontaminating the Soviet-era Nukus chemical research facility.  Other aid will help keep
Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research.  U.S. aid has been used to
eliminate active anthrax spores and other hazards at a Soviet-era CBW testing site on an
island in the Aral Sea belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  (See also CRS Report
RL31539, Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism.)
Trade and Investment
The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms directly
serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services, and
sources of energy and minerals.  U.S. private  investment committed to Central Asia has
greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan,
although the region is relatively isolated and the states lag behind Russia in accommodating
commercial ties.  However, corruption is stifling the emergence of the rule of law, as
exemplified by allegations that both Nazarbayev and Niyazov siphoned energy revenues into
bank accounts they controlled.  Currency convertibility problems in Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan stymie investment, business growth, and trade.  In October 2002, U.S.
Ambassador to Kazakhstan Larry Napper announced a “Houston Initiative” of U.S. aid to
support enhanced U.S. investment in both energy and non-energy sectors to foster diverse
economic development.  However, a foreign investment law signed in Kazakhstan in January
2003 appears to lower safeguards against contractual violations by the Kazakh government.
U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian
states.  Permanent normal trade relations with Kyrgyzstan were established by law in June
2000, so that Jackson-Vanik trade provisions calling for presidential reports and waivers no
longer apply.  The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short-term
insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and
bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan.  The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on
insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or
insurance in all the states except Tajikistan. The Central Asian American Enterprise Fund,
authorized by Congress to lend up to $150 million, was bedeviled by convertibility problems
and major defaults on its joint venture loans and has halted operations.
All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could yield export
earnings, but major investments are needed to revamp, develop, or market the resources in
most cases.  The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports but need
added foreign investment for production and transport.  Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold
production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported.  It also has moderate
energy reserves.  Kyrgyzstan owns major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, is a
major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism.  Tajikistan has one of the world’s
largest aluminum processing plants and is a major cotton grower.
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Energy Resources.   U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central
Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the
West, supporting U.S. private investment, breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas
transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia (but see
below), promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally
Turkey, and opposing  the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or
otherwise give it undue influence over the region.  Security for Caspian region pipelines and
energy resources also has been a recent interest.  President Bush’s May 2001 National
Energy Policy report suggests that greater oil production in the Caspian region could not only
benefit regional economies, but also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions.  It
recommends U.S. support for building  oil and gas pipelines from Baku, Azerbaijan, through
Tbilisi, Georgia, to Ceyhan, Turkey, coaxing Kazakhstan to use the oil pipeline, and
otherwise encouraging the regional states to provide a stable and inviting business climate
for energy development.  It avers that the building of the pipelines will enhance energy
supply diversification, including for Georgia and Turkey.  In August 2002, U.S. Coordinator
of Assistance to Eurasia William Taylor resurrected U.S. support (dropped during Taliban
rule) for construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan
and possibly to India.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Caspian region is emerging as
a significant source of oil and gas for world markets.  Oil resources, DOE reports, are
comparable to those of the North Sea, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan rank
among the top countries in terms of proven and probable gas reserves.  DOE reports
estimates of 10-17.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 53-83 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas in Kazakhstan, and 98-155 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves in
Turkmenistan.  Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field began to be exploited by Chevron-Texaco and
Kazakhstan during 1993 in a consortium called TengizChevoil (U.S. Exxon-Mobil, ARCO,
and Russia’s LUKoil later joined).  The non-Kazakh partners balked in late 2002 at a Kazakh
demand for higher taxes, but the dispute seemed to be resolved in early 2003.  In July 2002,
another consortium led by Italy’s Agip oil firm reported findings from its test wells and
research that Kazakhstan’s Kashagan offshore Caspian oil field had between 7-9 billion
barrels of oil in proven reserves and up to 38 billion barrels in probable reserves, comparable
to those of Tengiz.  Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are over 630,000 barrels per day
(bpd), compared to 3 million bpd for Russia.  (See also CRS Report RS21190, Caspian Oil
and Gas: Production and Prospects.)
The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets.
In a strategy similar to one Russia has used in other CIS and in Eastern Europe, where it
restricted energy supplies until given commercial concessions, Russia’s restrictions on
Tengiz oil exports to Europe were eased slightly in 1996 after the consortium admitted
LUKoil, and after Gazprom was admitted to another consortium.  Russian shareholders have
a controlling interest, 44 percent, in the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC), which
completed construction in late 2001 on a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk – the region’s first new large-capacity pipeline – that initially
carries 560,000 bpd, and eventually will carry 1.3 million bpd.  President Bush hailed the
opening of the pipeline as an example “that the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan are
cooperating to build prosperity and stability in this part of the world.”  He stated that the
CPC project also “advances my Administration’s National Energy Policy by developing a
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network of multiple Caspian pipelines ... [that] help diversify U.S. energy supply and
enhance our energy security.”  The Administration’s advocacy of pipeline routes that break
Russia’s near-monopoly of existing routes may be changing following the signing of a
Statement on Energy Cooperation at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia Summit.
In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth largest natural gas producer.  It
is now largely dependent on Russian export routes.  It tried unsuccessfully for several years
to get higher prices for its gas sales to Russia’s natural gas firm Gazprom (or its subsidiary
Itera).  Appearing to resolve this issue, Presidents Putin and Niyazov signed a 25-year accord
in April 2003 on the supply of up to 80 million cubic meters of gas per year to Russia, tying
up the bulk of Turkmenistan’s planned gas exports.  Under the deal, Gazprom will pay far
less than world market price for the gas, permitting it to export more of its own gas to Europe
at world market prices.  According to Niyazov, the deal could result in revenues of up to
$100 billion for Turkmenistan (plus goods and services Gazprom will value at $100 billion),
compared to $300 billion that would be earned by Gazprom, seemingly indicating Niyazov’s
resignation concerning Russia’s control of the main export route.
Before the April 2003 Russian-Turkmen gas supply agreement, Turkmenistan tried to
diversify its export routes.  In December 1997, it opened the first pipeline from Central Asia
to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran’s pipeline system,
but disputes have limited the amount of gas sent to Iran.   Some oil is also sent to Iran in a
swap arrangement.  In November 1999, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey
signed a framework accord on a trans-Caspian gas pipeline, but contention between
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over shipment quotas for this planned pipeline, and other
problems, scuttled Turkmen participation.  Turkmenistan also has been unsuccessful in
convincing investors to help it build a gas pipeline through still-unstable Afghanistan.
Aid Overview
The Bush Administration provided added security and other assistance to the Central
Asian states in FY2002 in response to the events of September 11, 2001.  Some observers
characterized this assistance as a U.S. quid pro quo for the use of military facilities and an
incentive for continued cooperation.  The Administration has argued that the safer
environment in the Central Asian states fostered by security assistance and the U.S. military
presence should permit greater democratization, respect for human rights, and economic
liberalization in the region, and the development of Caspian energy resources. 
For much of the 1990s and until 9/11, U.S. assistance to Central Asian states was far
less than that to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia (most such aid was funded from the
FREEDOM Support Act account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived
from other program and agency budgets).  Cumulative foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia
for FY1992 through FY2002 amounted to $2.76 billion, about 13% of the amount obligated
to all the Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union, reflecting the lesser priority given to
these states prior to 9/11.  The amount of aid provided to Central Asia usually but not always
tracked with the “roller coaster” of declining (FY1994-FY1997), increasing (FY1998-
FY1999), and declining (FY2000-FY2001) aid provided to the rest of the Eurasian states.
In FY2000, despite declining FREEDOM Support Act assistance, budgeted support for
Central Asia increased to $222.57 million (including other program and Agency funding).
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Map: Central Asia’s New States
The same situation occurred in FY2001.  Estimated spending for FY2002 for Central Asia,
during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts and as a percent of total aid to Eurasia.
Aid amounts for FY2003 and proposed for FY2004 appear less in absolute amounts than in
FY2002, but aid to Central Asia planned for FY2004 looms larger as a percent (27%) of the
total FREEDOM Support Act aid to Eurasia (see Table 1).  
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial
institutions and nongovernmental organizations that aid Central Asia.  Policy issues
regarding U.S. aid include whether the states are properly using it (is the aid subject to
corruption or is the aid conditioned on reforms), what it should be used for, and who should
receive it.  (For details, see CRS Issue Brief IB95077, The Former Soviet Union and U.S.
Foreign Assistance.)
Table 1.  U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia















Kazakhstan 885.95 74.87 89.34 42.72 32
Kyrgyzstan 635.03 41.46 95.66 37.85 40
Tajikistan 489.96 56.48 141.29 25.8 35
Turkmenistan 218.2 12.57 18.06 7.8 8
Uzbekistan 530.59 57.22 239.78 38.75 42
Total 2,759.73** 242.6 584.13 152.92 157
Percent 13% 21% 25% 20% 27%
Source: State Department, Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.   
*FREEDOM Support Act and Agency funds.
**In addition, $22.61 million in region-wide funds were budgeted FY1992-FY2002.
***FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds, not including Defense or Energy Department funds;
the FY2004 request excludes funding for exchanges.
